Commitment compliance in G-7 summit macroeconomic policy coordination

Authors
Citation
Q. Li, Commitment compliance in G-7 summit macroeconomic policy coordination, POLIT RES Q, 54(2), 2001, pp. 355-378
Citations number
55
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
ISSN journal
1065-9129 → ACNP
Volume
54
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
355 - 378
Database
ISI
SICI code
1065-9129(200106)54:2<355:CCIGSM>2.0.ZU;2-L
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that the G-7 summit makes few substantive deci sions and lacks effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to enforce individual countries' commitments. However, evidence exists that G-7 countr ies do honor their commitments announced in summit declarations. In this ar ticle, I offer and test for the period from 1975 to 1989 several causal exp lanations for compliance with non-binding commitments dealing with inflatio n control: institutional constraints on monetary and fiscal policymaking, e lectoral politics, uncertainty, and reciprocity. Reciprocating behaviors, i ndependent central banks, and high current inflation rates correlate positi vely with compliance over inflation-control commitments. In addition, there is some evidence that divided/coalition governments and uncertainty reduce compliance. Theoretical and policy implications of the findings are discus sed.