Locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal

Citation
I. Ray et J. Williams, Locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal, J DEV ECON, 67(1), 2002, pp. 129-155
Citations number
47
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN journal
0304-3878 → ACNP
Volume
67
Issue
1
Year of publication
2002
Pages
129 - 155
Database
ISI
SICI code
0304-3878(200202)67:1<129:LAATPF>2.0.ZU;2-K
Abstract
Illegal water diversions and lax rule-enforcement are common on irrigation canals. We present a mathematical programming model of a watercourse, calib rated to a canal in Maharashtra on which farmers voted to cooperate to cont rol water theft. The model solution computes the crop choices and profits o f individually optimizing farmers who differ in their location. It reveals the spatial distribution of gains and losses from cooperation. It illuminat es why voluntary bargaining will rarely achieve an efficient water allocati on. It also shows that landless laborers might well be against local cooper ation, if the expropriated water nurtures labor-intensive crops, (C) 2002 E lsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.