Multiple asymmetry and concord resolutions of a conflict

Citation
I. Eshel et E. Sansone, Multiple asymmetry and concord resolutions of a conflict, J THEOR BIO, 213(2), 2001, pp. 209-222
Citations number
9
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Multidisciplinary
Journal title
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
ISSN journal
0022-5193 → ACNP
Volume
213
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
209 - 222
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-5193(20011121)213:2<209:MAACRO>2.0.ZU;2-J
Abstract
A model for a population-game with multiple asymmetry is studied, in which the participants are assumed to be different from one another both in size and in status as owners or non-owners of a territory. Only owners can repro duce, hence natural selection is assumed to operate in favor of the increas e of ownership-time. Conditions for the evolutionary stability of the Bourg eois Principle of owner-priority, despite difference in body size, are char acterized. It is shown that ownership-priority tends to be at least partial ly replaced by strength-priority as the availability of habitats, the expec ted longevity of potential intruders and the harm inflicted on the loser of an aggressive confrontation decrease, and as the expected longevity of the owner increases. It is further established that the combined effect of all these parameters can be characterized by a single parameter, referred to a s the concord coefficient of the population. Finally, when this parameter r eaches a certain critical level, only strength-priority can prevail. If the concord coefficient decreases below this critical level, no priority-rule can remain stable in the population, in which case aggressive confrontation s cannot be avoided, at least in certain situations. In this case, it is sh own that aggression emerges first among low-rank individuals. (C) 2001 Acad emic Press.