Multiple asymmetry and concord resolutions of a conflict

Eshel, I Sansone, E

I. Eshel et E. Sansone, Multiple asymmetry and concord resolutions of a conflict, J THEOR BIO, 213(2), 2001, pp. 209-222

9

INGLESE

Article

Multidisciplinary

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

0022-5193 → ACNP

213

2

2001

209 - 222

ISI

0022-5193(20011121)213:2<209:MAACRO>2.0.ZU;2-J

A model for a population-game with multiple asymmetry is studied, in which the participants are assumed to be different from one another both in size and in status as owners or non-owners of a territory. Only owners can repro duce, hence natural selection is assumed to operate in favor of the increas e of ownership-time. Conditions for the evolutionary stability of the Bourg eois Principle of owner-priority, despite difference in body size, are char acterized. It is shown that ownership-priority tends to be at least partial ly replaced by strength-priority as the availability of habitats, the expec ted longevity of potential intruders and the harm inflicted on the loser of an aggressive confrontation decrease, and as the expected longevity of the owner increases. It is further established that the combined effect of all these parameters can be characterized by a single parameter, referred to a s the concord coefficient of the population. Finally, when this parameter r eaches a certain critical level, only strength-priority can prevail. If the concord coefficient decreases below this critical level, no priority-rule can remain stable in the population, in which case aggressive confrontation s cannot be avoided, at least in certain situations. In this case, it is sh own that aggression emerges first among low-rank individuals. (C) 2001 Acad emic Press.