Evolution of communication with partial common interest

Citation
A. Blume et al., Evolution of communication with partial common interest, GAME ECON B, 37(1), 2001, pp. 79-120
Citations number
27
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN journal
0899-8256 → ACNP
Volume
37
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
79 - 120
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(200110)37:1<79:EOCWPC>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with i mperfect incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless message s and messages with pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentiv e conditions, we get communication outcomes. However, it is by no means a f ait accompli. We observe significant deterioration and recoding of a priori meanings, sucker behavior by receivers, and focal point and initial condit ion effects. A conservative partial common interest (PCI) condition general ly is a reliable, albeit coarse predictor of the form of communication. Equ ilibrium selection criteria sometimes improve on the PCI prediction but nei ther influentiality, ex ante efficiency, nor Farrell's neologism-proofness refinement is reliable across all games, and equilibria are not always obta ined. Considering comparative statics, equilibrium selection criteria are h elpful but imperfect predictors of how equilibrium frequencies respond to i ncentives, whereas the less ambitious PCI prediction is never rejected by t he data. (C) 2001 Academic Press.