Coordination of safe, selfish sentinels based on mutual benefits

Authors
Citation
Pa. Bednekoff, Coordination of safe, selfish sentinels based on mutual benefits, ANN ZOO FEN, 38(1), 2001, pp. 5-14
Citations number
31
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Animal Sciences
Journal title
ANNALES ZOOLOGICI FENNICI
ISSN journal
0003-455X → ACNP
Volume
38
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
5 - 14
Database
ISI
SICI code
0003-455X(2001)38:1<5:COSSSB>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
Sentinels are group members that watch from prominent positions. Sentinel i nterchanges often appear orderly and the number of sentinels changes little despite the turnover of individuals. I modeled why solitary individuals or group members might take up prominent positions. Such positions can be saf e places to rest because they provide a good view of approaching predators, even if undetected predators preferentially attack sentinels. In pairs, co ordinated sentinel behavior is favored whenever information spreads from a detecting to a non-detecting individual more than half the time. Under thes e conditions, safety for a sentinel produces safety for a forager as a by-p roduct. Thus sentinel behavior occurs for selfish safety reasons but coordi nation of sentinels is based on mutualism. If sentinels can coordinate thei r individual actions, evidence of the game is hidden from view. The fitness consequences of some games may be best indicated by the strategies organis ms take to avoid playing them.