Security of E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis

Citation
S. Moriai et al., Security of E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis, IEICE T FUN, E84A(1), 2001, pp. 319-325
Citations number
10
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Eletrical & Eletronics Engineeing
Journal title
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
ISSN journal
0916-8508 → ACNP
Volume
E84A
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
319 - 325
Database
ISI
SICI code
0916-8508(200101)E84A:1<319:SOEATD>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
This paper evaluates the security of the block cipher E2 against truncated differential cryptanalysis. We show an algorithm to search for effective tr uncated differentials. The result of the search confirmed that there exist no truncated differentials that lead to possible attacks for E2 with more t han 8 rounds. The best attack breaks an 8-round variant of E2 with either I T-Function (the initial transformation) or FT-Function (the final transform ation) using 2(94) chosen plaintexts. We also found the attack which distin guishes a 7-round variant of E2 with IT- and FT-Functions from a random per mutation using 2(91) chosen plaintexts.