The paper is a reply to the critique of Christian Etzrodt in two points, wh
ere he was discussing the model of frame-selection which I formulated follo
wing some suggestions of Alfred Schutz on the problem of bounded rationalit
y: (1) The model does not exclude at all the processes of the "interactive"
and symbolic constitution of social situations; (2) it does in no way rely
on the "rationality" of the actors alone. It does, however, assume quite a
different mechanism to the assumption of "calculativeness", usually associ
ated with subjected-expected-utility theory, despite it is based on certain
formal assumptions of this theory. The core of the framing-concept is the
"match" of typical properties of the situation (i.e. "symbols") with social
ly shared mental models, which are part of the identity of the actors. Quit
e different to the assumptions of Etzrodt, the model thus systematically ta
kes into account the "meaning" of social action and the strength of culture
in defining a situation.