Amnesties and co-operation

Citation
N. Marceau et S. Mongrain, Amnesties and co-operation, INT TAX P F, 7(3), 2000, pp. 259-273
Citations number
12
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE
ISSN journal
0927-5940 → ACNP
Volume
7
Issue
3
Year of publication
2000
Pages
259 - 273
Database
ISI
SICI code
0927-5940(200005)7:3<259:AAC>2.0.ZU;2-Y
Abstract
One of the costs of anticipated amnesties is current and future non-complia nce with the law. Relatively to a no-amnesty situation, efficient enforceme nt policies may therefore differ when an amnesty is offered. To study this question, a model is built in which individuals impose a cost on society wh en they commit a crime. When a criminal participates in an amnesty, or (to a lesser extent) when he is caught, some fraction of the social cost is rec overed, reflecting co-operation with the authorities. The analysis characte rizes efficient anticipated amnesties. It is shown that the efficient level of enforcement may be smaller in the case of an anticipated amnesty than i n a no-amnesty situation. The reason is that despite the increase in the in itial number of criminals generated by the amnesty, many criminals eventual ly participate in it. If participants in the amnesty are very co-operative, then a large proportion of the social cost is recovered making the initial increase in the number of criminals less costly. The optimal level of the reduced sanction imposed on those who participate in the amnesty is also ch aracterized.