A RELUCTANCE-BASED COST DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY FOR MULTIAGENT PLANNING

Citation
Jn. Suarez et al., A RELUCTANCE-BASED COST DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY FOR MULTIAGENT PLANNING, Applied intelligence, 9(1), 1998, pp. 39-55
Citations number
14
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Article
Categorie Soggetti
Computer Science Artificial Intelligence","Computer Science Artificial Intelligence
Journal title
ISSN journal
0924-669X
Volume
9
Issue
1
Year of publication
1998
Pages
39 - 55
Database
ISI
SICI code
0924-669X(1998)9:1<39:ARCDSF>2.0.ZU;2-J
Abstract
In this paper we present CODMAPS, a COst Distribution Method for Agent Planning Systems. The strategy is based on individual distribution of cost and competitive behavior. Our model emulates how human agents wo rk in expert groups. They all share a common objective, however, they also have individual interests and try to steer the planning process t owards their own goals. Two opposing trends coexist within the set: gl obal co-operation and individual utility maximization. External evalua tion must guarantee the validity of the final plan at global level, bu t a negotiation and cost distribution strategy must ensure that cost i s adequately shared throughout the agent set. We introduce the concept of reluctance as a regulation mechanism to facilitate it. A statistic al model allows agents to adapt their attitude towards negotiation dep ending on their negotiation state vector, which encompasses all histor y of previous negotiations by the agent. Previous research into this p roblem had taken the ''rational'' approach. A group of agents choose t he ''best'' alternative given the current possibilities. This not only forces the agents to exchange and ''understand'' other agents' propos als (which is computationally expensive), but also neglects the past n egotiation history of each individual agent. Our approach facilitates distribution of cost across the agent set given the agents' past histo ry and the importance of their constraints. The more taxed an agent be comes the more reluctant it will be to relax, thus pushing other agent s less taxed to accept to compromise. It does not need explicit constr aint information exchange, thus simplifying the negotiation process.