MONETARY-POLICY SIGNALING AND THE SENATE-BANKING-COMMITTEE

Authors
Citation
Il. Morris, MONETARY-POLICY SIGNALING AND THE SENATE-BANKING-COMMITTEE, Social science quarterly, 76(4), 1995, pp. 902-910
Citations number
29
Language
INGLESE
art.tipo
Note
Categorie Soggetti
Social, Sciences, Interdisciplinary
Journal title
ISSN journal
0038-4941
Volume
76
Issue
4
Year of publication
1995
Pages
902 - 910
Database
ISI
SICI code
0038-4941(1995)76:4<902:MSATS>2.0.ZU;2-P
Abstract
Objective. Although the relationship between the president and the Fed eral Reserve dominates the study of monetary policymaking, recent rese arch suggests that Congress, too, plays a role in monetary policymakin g. This note identifies political and economic factors which influence the monetary policy preferences of members of the Senate. Methods. Da ta on individual-level monetary policy signaling are gathered from mon etary policy oversight hearings held by the Senate Banking Committee. Regression analysis is then utilized to explain the variance in these signaling data. Results. Republican senators tend to signal for more r estrictive monetary policies than Democratic senators. Also, senators tend to signal for greater monetary ease during their reelection years than at other times. Finally, while the condition of the national eco nomy influences senatorial signaling, local economic conditions, as me asured by state-level unemployment data, do not have an impact on sena torial signaling. Conclusions. As scholars begin to explore the role w hich Congress plays in monetary policymaking, the political and econom ic variables which influence senatorial policy preferences cannot be i gnored.